mobile business

Lecture 6

Electronic Signatures

Information & Communication Security
(WS 2014)

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Agenda

- General Concept
- Algorithms
- Legal Framework
- German Signature Market
- Recent Initiatives in Europe
- Mobile Signatures
- Secure Display Components and Personal Security Assistants

Digital Signatures



- Protect the authenticity and integrity of documents signed by A
- B has to get an authentic copy of A's public key.

Asymmetric Signature System



➲ locked glass show-case; just one key to put something in

[Federrath and Pfitzmann 1997]

Example PGP: Encrypt and Sign a Message



Example PGP: Decrypt and Check a Message



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Asymmetric Signature Systems: Examples

- RSA: **R**ivest, **S**hamir, **A**dleman
  - Asymmetric encryption system which also can be used as a signature system via “inverted use”,
  - Message encrypted with the private key (= signing key) gives the signature,
  - Decoding with the public key (=testing key) has to produce the message.

[Rivest et al. 1978]

- DSA: Digital Signature Algorithm
  - Determined in the Digital Signature Standard of the NIST (USA),
  - Based on discrete logarithms (Schnorr, ElGamal),
  - Key length is set to 1024 bit.

Asymmetric Signature System (Simplified Example RSA)



- Signing key s only with the sender, test key t public
- Example is often mistakenly generalized.

Asymmetric Signature System (Example RSA)



- Signing key s only with the sender, test key t public
- Example is often mistakenly generalized.

Hash Functions

- **General** hash functions *(H(s))*
  - Transformation of an input string *s* into an output string *h* **of fixed length** which is called hash value.
  - Example: mod 10 in the decimal system
- **Cryptographic** hash functions
  - Generally require further characteristics
    - *H*(*s*) is easily to compute for each *s*.
    - *H*(*s*) must be difficult to invert: In terms of figures it is difficult to compute *s* from *h*.
    - Virtual collision freedom: In terms of figures it is difficult to create collisions H(s1) = H(s2).
  - Examples: SHA-1, MD5, MD4

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German Signature Law (SigG)

First version in 1997 as Article 3 of the IuKDG "Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz"

- Excerpt from the text:

> **§ 1 Zweck und Anwendungsbereich**
>
> (1) Zweck des Gesetzes ist es Rahmenbedingungen für digitale Signaturen zu schaffen, unter denen diese als sicher gelten und Fälschungen digitaler Signaturen oder Verfälschungen von signierten Daten zuverlässig festgestellt werden können.

- NB: The legal status of electronic signatures will be defined in sector specific regulation, e.g. the „Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) for general commercial contracts".

From SigG 1997 to Signature-law in 2013



Based on [Roßnagel 2007][www.bundesnetzagentur.de]

Abbreviations

1.SigÄndG	1. Signaturänderungsgesetz
EC-Directive	Directive 1999/93/EC
EHuG	Gesetz über elektronische Handelsregister und Genossenschaftsregister sowie das Unternehmensregister
JKomG	Justizkommunikationsgesetz
SigG	Signaturgesetz
SigV	Signaturverordnung
VwVfÄndG	Gesetz zur Änderung verwaltungsverfahrensrechtlicher Vorschriften

SigG Requirements as to Technical Components

Example: display of data (§ 17(2)) [SigG01]

The signature component must:

- Clearly notify the signer that a signature is to be created *before* the signature is created
- Make clearly perceptible which data the signature refers to
- Secure the accordance of displayed data and signed data (“What you see is what you sign.”)

Hierarchical Certification of Public Keys
(Example: German Signature Law)

Regulatory Authority confirms public keys of the CAs



- The actual checking of the identity of the key owner takes place at so called Registration Authorities (e.g. notaries, bank branches, T-Points, ...)
- Security of the infrastructure depends on the reliability of the CAs.

Content of a Key Certificate
(according to German Signature Law and Regulation)



Tasks of a Certification Authority
(according to German Signature Law and Regulation)

- Reliable identification of persons who apply for a certificate
- Information on necessary methods for fraud resistant creation of a signature
- Provision for secure storage of the private key
  - At least Smartcard (protected with PIN)
- Publication of the certificate (if wanted)
- Barring of certificates
- If necessary emission of time stamps
  - For a fraud resistant proof that an electronic document has been at hand at a specific time

Requirements to an Accredited CA
(according to German Signature Law and related Regulation)

- Checking of the following items by certain confirmation centers (BSI, TÜVIT, ...)
  - Concept of operational security
  - Reliability of the executives and of the employees as well as of their know-how
  - Financial power for continuous operation
  - Exclusive usage of licensed technical components according to SigG and SigV
  - Security requirements as to operating premises and their access controls
- Possibly license of the regulation authority

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Signature Market

- Legal and technical framework exists for years.
- So far qualified electronic signatures are not successful in the market.
- Circa 0.4 million qualified certificates in total have been issued in Germany from 2001 to 2010 [Sommer 2011].

➲ Expectations have not been fulfilled.

Fees (in €)

Certificate Service Providers (CSP)	Fee for Issuing of a certificate	Basic fee per year of use	Total fee for 2-year usage
D-Trust GmbH	41	29	99
Deutsche Post Signtrust	0	39	78
TC Trust Center	8	62	132
T-TeleSec	23,57	42,95	109,47

[Lippmann and Roßnagel 2005]

CSP	Basic fee per year of use
DATEV eG	78

[www.datev.de]

Costs and Benefits

	Private Customers		Companies		Public Administration	
	Costs	Benefits	Costs	Benefits	Costs	Benefits
Electronic bid invitations			■	■		■
Electronic tax declaration	■		■			■
Access to public archives	■		■	■		■
Electronic elections	■					■
Application for public documents	■					■
Notifying change of residence	■					■
Electronic dunning procedures			■	■		■
Electronic marketplaces	■	■	■	■	■	■
Automated orderings			■	■	■	■
Online-Banking	■		■	■	■	
Alteration of contracts online	■			■		
Electronic billing			■	■		
Archiving			■	■	■	■
Total	**8**	**1**	**9**	**9**	**4**	**10**

[Lippmann and Roßnagel 2005]

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European Initiatives

- In Germany:
  - “Gesundheitskarte“
  - “Job card“
  - “Digitaler Personalausweis“
- In Austria:
  - “Bürgerkarte“
  - A1 Signature
- In Belgium:
  - Belgium eID Card (BELPIC)
- In Finland:
  - Universal eID Card
  - Mobile Signatures
- In Denmark:
  - OCES (“Offentlige Certifikater til Elektronisk Service“)
- And 12 other European countries. [www.eurosmart.com]

European Initiatives

- All initiatives focus on high penetration rate of signature capable smart cards within the complete population.
- But high penetration rate of smart cards does not necessarily lead to adoption of electronic signatures
  - E.g. German “Geldkarte”
- Specific targeting of early adopters might be more successful.

[Fritsch and Roßnagel 2005]

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Qualified Electronic Signatures

- Advanced electronic signatures:
  - Uniquely linked to the signatory
  - Capable of identifying the signatory
  - Created using means that the signatory maintains under his sole control
  - Linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable
- Qualified certificates:
  - Can be issued for advanced signatures by CSPs if they meet the requirements of Annex I of the EC Directive

[EC-Directive 1999]

Mobile Signatures

- Mobile signatures are signatures, which are created using a mobile device and which rely on signature or certification services in a location independent telecommunication environment.
- Usage: signatory mobility beyond fixed, secure desktop workstation with trusted, personal signing equipment.

[Roßnagel 2004]

Server vs. Client Signatures

- Server based electronic signatures are signatures, that are created by a service provider for a user.
- Client signatures are electronic signatures created only by means of the mobile device.

[Roßnagel 2004]

Server Signatures Infrastructure

Mobile device



Signature Server

CSP

Relying party

0: Certificate Service Provider (CSP) creates certificate.
1: Mobile user authorizes signature on server.
2: Server creates signature for mobile user.
3: Signature sent to mobile user
4: Signature sent to relying party

[Roßnagel 2004]

Analysis of Server Signatures

- Private key is under control of the server.
  - This violates article 2,2 (c) of EC directive for advanced signatures:
    "…by means the signatory can maintain under his sole control."
- Infrastructure to enforce secure authorization of server signatures has high complexity.

[Roßnagel 2004]

Client Signatures: Multiple Cards

Use of separate smart cards for telephony and signature:

- Dual Card
  Exchange of SIM against Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD)
- Dual Slot
  Mobile device carries two card readers for SIM and SSCD

[Roßnagel 2004]

Client Signatures: SIM based

- One smart card with both functions
  - Can be equivalent to established SSCDs
  - Can be certified according to security evaluation criteria
  - Under control of the user
- Needs two different PIN codes!

[Roßnagel 2004]

Challenges of SIM Signatures |1

- Who owns the smart card?
  - SIM issued by Mobile Operator (MO)
  - SSCD issued by CSP
  - SIM stores keys that belong to MO & user.
  - What happens to signature when user changes Mobile Operator?
- Challenge:
  Provide a shipment model for SIM cards within the MO distribution scheme that gives users a choice of their CSP.

[Roßnagel 2004]

Challenges of SIM Signatures |2

- Customer wants to use SIM right away, but certification for signature takes time.
- Solution:
  - Handing out the signature capable SIM Card and
  - adding signing functionality later on request.
- Is this still an advanced signature based on a qualified certificate?

[Roßnagel 2004]

Certification on Demand



[Roßnagel 2004]

Certification on Demand

1. The MO gives IMSI/Ki pairs to a card manufacturer (or lets them be generated there based on information from the MO).
2. The card manufacturer returns (or provides) a SIM card containing an IMSI/Ki pair, a key generator for the signature application and the public key of the RootCA to the Mobile Operator.
3. The SIM card is sold to the customer and the Mobile Operator provides a nullpin, that is used to activate the signing functionality.
4. The customer activates the signing functionality by entering the nullpin.
5. The customer registers at a Registration Authority of his choice, providing identification information and his public key.
6. The customer sends his identification information signed with his private key over the air to the Certification Authority.
7. The Registration Authority sends the public key and the identification information to the Certification Authority.
8. If the information provided by the customer and the Registration Authority match the Certification Authority issues a certificate for the customer and sends it over the air to his mobile phone.
9. The user can verify the validity of his certificate by checking the certificate issued by the RootCA for the Certification Service Provider

[Roßnagel 2004]

Certification on Demand

- Distribution scheme of Mobile Operator stays intact.
- Signature capable SIM will be more expensive but MO can create revenue with:
  - Increase in traffic
  - Selling signature capable SIM cards at a higher price
- CSP gains large potential customer base

[Roßnagel 2004]

Mobility and Signing

- Restrictions in mobile devices
  - Expensive, low-band data transfer, e.g. over GSM/ GPRS
  - Visualization of complex “Document To Be Signed” (DTBS) on mobile device’s small display is tricky.
  - Online-verification of certification paths with low-band data rates is not always feasible.
  - Limited memory may hinder the proper processing of revocation lists.
- Platform security
  - Mobile phones are becoming open platforms
  - A trusted device is necessary (➲ TCG/Perseus)

[Roßnagel 2004]

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Presentation Problems



Mr. Schulz



Ms. Meier



But check for hidden text !!!!

[Based on IsRo]

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Example: display of data (§ 17(2)) [SigG01]

The signature component must:

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Secure Equipment: Threats from Trojan Horses



Private key on HD, in memory



Private key and signature function in chip card

Secure Equipment: Avoiding Threats from Trojan Horses



Wallet with
private key and
signature function

Secure Equipment: How to view a document

Order

Buyer's organization, address, country
Tel./fax/email/URL
Company registration no.
VAT-No.
Buyer's name
Certificate
Seller's organization, address, country
Seller's name
Date
Buyer's reference number
Content description
Seller's article number
Buyer's article number
Number of items
Unit of item
Item price
Tax
Freight and delivery
Total
Currency
Shipping address
Comments
Appended files
Applicable Law
Agreed means of payment
Payment agreed by
Buyer's signature

Split User Interface

← All fields on normal screen

Essential fields on secure hardware

↓

Order

Buyer
Certificate
Date
Description
Total
Currency
Signature

Personal Terminals

A popular vision: Security Assistants

- Storing personal data
  - Addresses, calendars
  - Money, keys
  - Preferences …
- Performs sensitive processes
  - Decoding of confidential messages
  - Signature creation
  - Contract confirmation
- Assists negotiations
  - Documents which are accepted by other parties
  - Methods of payment
  - Reachability



Challenges of Personal Terminals

- Usability
  - Portability
  - Good visibility of important information (“new network“)
  - Adequate representation of the functionality
- Protection from
  - Unauthorized access to stored data
  - Manipulation of the functionality (e.g. “Trojan Horses”)
  - Denial-of-Service attacks
- Trust (of non-experts)
  - Does the equipment what it shall do?
  - How (much) can I trust it?

Personal Security Assistants Platforms?

- Personal digital assistants
- Mobile phones
- Watches
- Pens
- Chip cards
- …

Literature

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